http://www.rhci-online.net/radiogram/radiogram.htm

 


  https://github.com/GyanD/codexffmpeg/releases/tag/2023-03-05-git-912ac82a3c

set MyFiles=*.flac *.fla *.wav *.aif *.mp4 *.mp3 *.mp2 *.aac *.ogg *.m4a
for %%a in (%MyFiles%) do ffmpeg -i "%%a" -y -lavfi showspectrumpic=s=1920x1080:color=fiery:gain=.7:fscale=lin:orientation=0:saturation=1:mode=combined:legend=enabled:start=0:stop=8000 "%%~na.jpg"

 

 

 

 

 

RSID: <<2023-05-18T23:31Z MFSK-32 @ 9265000+1500>>


Welcome to program 305 of Shortwave Radiogram.

I'm Kim Andrew Elliott in Arlington, Virginia USA.

Here is the lineup for today's program, in MFSK modes as noted:

  1:39 MFSK32: Program preview (now)
  2:47 MFSK32: Jupiter probe antenna finally deploys
  5:58 MFSK64: Myanmar consolidates control of telecom providers
11:28 MFSK64: This week's images*
27:33 MFSK32: Closing announcements

* with image(s)


Please send reception reports to radiogram@verizon.net

And visit http://swradiogram.net

We're on Twitter now: @SWRadiogram

 


 

 

From New Atlas:

Success: Juice radar antenna breaks free after remote control
thump

By David Szondy
May 15, 2023

ESA's Juice Jupiter mission is back on track after Mission
Control in Darmstadt, Germany managed to shake loose and deploy
the stuck ice-penetrating Radar for Icy Moons Exploration (RIME)
antenna that was stuck due to a tiny pin.

It's been a case of slow nail biting at ESA as its Jupiter Icy
Moons Explorer (Juice) mission to study the planet's moons and
orbit Ganymede almost came to a premature end just as its
eight-year voyage to the giant planet had just begun.

After what seemed like a flawless launch on April 14, 2023 from
the Guiana Space Centre in Kourou, French Guiana, the spacecraft
entered its months-long commissioning phase where its instruments
would be deployed and put through the wringer to make sure they
were ready to go to work. Then the 16-m (52-ft) RIME antenna
jammed after only extending a third of the way and refusing to
swing into the open position.

The most likely culprit was a tiny pin that extended a few
millimeters too far, holding the antenna in place. Not having a
handy robotic arm aboard to give it a solid whack with a giant
mallet, the engineers came up with an alternative. They rotated
the spacecraft into the sunlight to heat up, much like one might
run a jam jar under a hot tap to loosen it. They then fired the
thrusters in an effort to shake the antenna loose. It moved a
bit, but not enough.

Then, on May 12, the team fired a Non-Explosive Actuator (NEA)
that delivered a big enough mechanical shock to shift the pin and
free the antenna, which swung dramatically away from the
spacecraft and extended itself. A second actuator in the
antenna's holding bracket was then activated, causing it to
unfold itself and lock into position.

Juice is now on its way to Jupiter and will make a series of
flybys of the Earth, Moon, Venus, and Mars. This will give it
enough velocity to reach Jupiter by January 2031.

https://newatlas.com/space/juice-radar-antenna-free/

 




Shortwave Radiogram now changes to MFSK64 ...


 

 

 

RSID: <<2023-05-18T23:36Z MFSK-64 @ 9265000+1500>>
 


This is Shortwave Radiogram in MFSK64

Please send your reception report to radiogram@verizon.net
 

 




From the Voice of America:

How Myanmar's Junta Uses Telecom Companies to Target Journalists

Liam Scott
May 16, 2023

WASHINGTON - Since the 2021 coup, Myanmar's military has
consolidated control over the country's mobile service providers,
putting activists, opposition members and journalists at greater
risk of surveillance, according to experts.

With the country's four mobile service providers now either
directly or indirectly linked to Myanmar's military, sensitive
user data is more easily accessible and could be used to
persecute opposition voices, experts say.

"The military in Myanmar has continued to oppress human rights
online in the face of ongoing civil disobedience, political
opposition, and armed conflict," Freedom House researcher Kian
Vesteinsson said.

The consolidation of mobile service providers means "people lose
out on being able to express themselves freely or enjoy the
privacy of their communications," he said. "The distinct risk
here is source safety and the safety of journalists."

Since the coup, Myanmar's military has killed more than 3,500
people, and over 17,900 remain detained for resisting the coup,
according to the human rights research group, Assistance
Association for Political Prisoners.

The U.N. Human Rights Office has said that the military's
actions, including airstrikes, likely amount to crimes against
humanity and war crimes.

Consolidating control over mobile service providers is part of
the military's broader strategy to monitor and censor the
internet, according to experts and journalists.

Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, a freelance reporter who left Myanmar after the
coup, believes media are at risk.

"For sure, independent media workers and journalists are the most
at target," said Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, who is now based in Hawaii.

Myanmar's military did not reply to VOA's request for comment
about its use of telecommunication companies to track people in
the country.

Myanmar has four mobile service providers: Mytel, ATOM, Ooredoo
and MPT. Before the coup, the military already owned Mytel and
MPT. Following the coup, ATOM - formerly the Myanmar operation of
Norwegian telecom giant Telenor - and Qatari-owned Ooredoo's
Myanmar operation came under ownership of junta-affiliated firms,
according to media reports.

But even before the coup, telecom and internet service providers
had been ordered to install intercept spyware that could give the
military power to listen in on calls, view texts and web traffic
including emails, and to track user location, Reuters reported.

In Myanmar, telecom company ownership is shrouded in layers of
secrecy. "It's purposefully opaque," says Oliver Spencer, an
adviser at the group Free Expression Myanmar.

A former Myanmar telecom company employee, however, told VOA that
to a certain extent, it doesn't matter that all four companies
are now linked to the military to varying degrees. The employee
requested that their name and former company be withheld for
safety reasons.

"In this current period, it doesn't matter who owns or how linked
the company is to the military. The response of the companies
would be identical," they said. "Compliance is the result."

In an email to VOA, ATOM's communications team said the telecom
company respects its customers' rights and privacy.

"ATOM Myanmar will never facilitate or allow unlawful
interception requests or equipment," ATOM said. "Our telecom
operation will always act in a law-abiding, ethical manner."

"We continue to provide essential communication services to the
people of Myanmar while respecting local and international laws;
upholding human rights; and advocating for consumer protection
regulations, especially in terms of data security, data
resilience, privacy, connectivity, roaming, internet access, and
others," ATOM said.

The other three telecom companies did not reply to VOA's requests
for comment.

The military is most interested in accessing the user data of
potential political opponents, resistance members and journalists
as part of its broader effort to squash dissent, analysts
believe.

That data can include details on who a user texts or calls, the
length of calls, location data, and contents of unencrypted
messages. Sometimes data can even reveal website history and
whether a user is using a VPN.

"All types of data requests that you can dream of - it's all done
here," the former employee said.

All the military needs is a phone number. That allows them to
track who else that individual calls and texts, according to
Spencer. "They're basically enabling the military to spy on their
customers," he said.

A former journalist, who has left Myanmar but asked for anonymity
for safety reasons, says that when a reporter's "mobile number is
exposed to police and military intelligence" they are no longer
secure.

"The journalists who are living in Myanmar are aware of digital
safety," he said, adding that more and more reporters use
encrypted platforms, regularly delete messages, and use two
phones - one for reporting and another for non-sensitive use. The
latter helps them pass through checkpoints, where police
regularly check and confiscate phones.

Journalists still inside Myanmar also often change their SIM
cards for security reasons, according to Nu Nu Lusan, a freelance
reporter based in Malaysia.

"I don't have much to worry about since I live outside the
country, but my concern is for the sources in Myanmar," she said.
She uses secure messaging platforms to communicate with sources
on the ground.

The Myanmar military's control over technology and the internet
with web shutdowns, online censorship, and surveillance has led
U.N. experts to describe the strategy as an attempt to establish
a "digital dictatorship."

Although the former telecom company employee said the situation
is less risky if users have access to a VPN and use encrypted
messaging platforms, "where the internet is cut off but the phone
line is not - that's where the risks are for journalists and
activists."

Across the country, all 330 townships have been subjected to
internet shutdowns at least once in 2022, with about 50 townships
facing shutdowns that measure more than one year, according to a
February report from the digital rights group Access Now.

"I try secure online communication options, but most conflict
areas have no internet access," Lusan said, so sources have to go
somewhere with service. "There is no absolute safe communication
when I communicate via telephone with the sources."

All of this means it can be dangerous for people on the ground to
communicate with each other and access banned independent news
websites, which makes it harder for people to stay up to date on
what's happening in their country and around the world.

"This is the military strategy," Spencer said, "to create a
system of fear."

https://www.voanews.com/a/how-myanmar-s-junta-uses-telecom-companies-to-target-journalists/7096082.html

 

 

 



This is Shortwave Radiogram in MFSK64

Please send your reception report to radiogram@verizon.net
 

 

 

 

 


This week's images ...

Our propagation indicator is this logo of the ABC television
network (USA). https://t.ly/7nCF ...

Sending Pic:210x126C;




 

 

 


A close view of a calla-lily petal. https://t.ly/jXVP ...

Sending Pic:198x140C;
 






Peaches by Maja Kowalczyk, Poland, winner in the age 10 and under
category of the Food Photographer of the Year 2023 competition.
https://t.ly/CvxQ ...

Sending Pic:199x137C;







Green hairstreak butterfly at Flanders Moss, Scotland.
https://t.ly/ap95g ...

Sending Pic:164x201C;






This donkey "posed perfectly" at Islay, Scotland.
https://t.ly/ap95g ...

Sending Pic:152x201C;



 

 

 



Upper level smoke from the Alberta wildfires caused a hazy sunset
in Woodbridge, New Jersey, May 9. https://t.ly/UL1G ...

Sending Pic:133x210C;






Perfoliate bellwort ("cow bells") at Black Rock Mountain State
Park, Georgia, May 13. https://t.ly/E2Oe ...

Sending Pic:177x193C;







Coral Bean (Erythrina herbacea) is blooming now and "attracting
hummingbirds and moths" at Myrtle Beach State Park, South
Carolina. https://t.ly/5SofP ...

Sending Pic:143x195C;

  

 

 




Our painting of the week is "Barnyard and Chickens" (and
outhouse) (1924) by George Bellows. https://t.ly/-fZ4 ...

Sending Pic:202x160C;






Shortwave Radiogram returns to MFSK32 ...


 

 

RSID: <<2023-05-19T23:57Z MFSK-32 @ 9265000+1500>>

 

 

This is Shortwave Radiogram in MFSK32 ...

 

Shortwave Radiogram is transmitted by:

WRMI, Radio Miami International, wrmi.net

and

WINB Shortwave, winb.com


Please send reception reports to radiogram@verizon.net

And visit http://swradiogram.net

Twitter: @SWRadiogram or twitter.com/swradiogram

I'm Kim Elliott. Please join us for the next Shortwave
Radiogram.

 

 

 


 

     https://jadquir.xyz/pages/mra/index.html#about

     SWRG#305  closing song:

    

     https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linda_Lewis

 

 

 

 

 


http://www.rhci-online.net/radiogram/radiogram.htm

 

 QTH:

 D-06193 Petersberg (Germany/Germania)

 Ant.:

 Dipol for 40m-Band    &   Boomerang Antenna 11m-Band

 RX   for  RF:

 FRG-100B + IF-mixer  &    ICOM IC-R75 + IF-mixer

 Software IF:

 con STUDIO1  -  Software italiano per SDR on Windows 11      [S-AM-USB/LSB]   +      HDSDR 2.81 beta6   - for scheduled IF-recording

 Software AF:

 Fldigi-4.1.26        +   flmsg-4.0.20                            images-fldigifiles on homedrive.lnk

 OS:

 Mirosoft Windows 11 Home

 German W7 32bit + 64bit

 PC: 

 ASUS S501MD (since 2023) [i7-12700 12th Gen. 12 x 2100 MHz]

 MSI-CR70-2MP345W7  (since 2014)   [i5 -P3560 ( 2 x 2600 MHz) ]

 

http://wiki.radioreference.com/index.php/Decoding_the_SW_Radiogram_Broadcasts

https://www.qsl.net/ve7vv/Files/Digital%20Modes.pdf


 

http://www.rhci-online.net/html/RNEI40-ch292.html

http://www.rhci-online.net/html/RNEI40.html

http://www.rhci-online.net/html/RNEI40-JP.html

http://www.rhci-online.net/html/RNEI40x.html            =RNEIxtra#8

http://www.rhci-online.net/html/RNEI41-ch292.html

http://www.rhci-online.net/html/RNEI41.html

 


 

RSID: <<2023-05-21T22:30Z MFSK-64 @ 5950000+1500>>

 

 

Peter “Pete” Townshend of The Who was born on May 19, 1945.

Sending Pic:171x246;

https://www.thewho.com/pete-townshend/
 

Please report your decode to themightykbc@gmail.com.